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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
tiff's action for wrongful death and for pain and suffering of the decedent
pending action by the Surrogate. Once the Surrogate determined to retain the
plaintiff as administratrix or to appoint someone to replace her, the wrongful
death and pain and suffering -actions could continue.
This interpretation of the Surrogate's Court Act, Sections 43 and 99
through 101, brings about a desirable result. The administratrix receives no
personal gain if she is retained as administratrix because any recovery on the
action for wrongful death would go to the lawful widow or next of kin of the
decedent, 6 and recovery in the pain and suffering action would go into the dece-
dent's estate.7 On the other hand, retention or replacement of the adminis-
tratrix, as distinguished from dismissal of the action and revocation of the
letters, can serve to save the cause of action, as it did in the instant case,
where a dismissal would bar a subsequent action because of the statute of
limitations.8
MENTAL DELUSION As BASIS FOR TESTAMENTARY INCAPACITY
There can be no doubt that a testator has the right to dispose of his
estate as he wishes and neither the reasonableness nor the justice of the dis-
posal shall effect his determination. The law will, if there is no lack of testa-
mentary capacity nor any showing of undue influence or fraud, expedite his
wishes as he has decreed. 9 Where there is a showing, however, of testamentary
incapacity which has affected a disposition made under the will, the law
will not permit the will to be probated. The party making the claim of
testamentary incapacity has the burden of proving it,'0 but once evidence has
been produced which establishes an unsound mental condition which could
have affected the disposition of the testator's estate, then the proponents have
the obligation of providing a reasonable basis for the testator's belief. It is
not necessary that testator be completely insane, if it can be shown that at
the time of the making of the will he was laboring under a morbid delusion
for which there was no reasonable basis." Therefore, once evidence has been
produced which allegedly establishes an unsound mental delusion and an
explanation thereof has been offered, the issue of testamentary incapacity be-
comes a question of fact to be determined by the jury.
In the case of In re Honigman's Will,'2 the testator, in a will dated just
one month before his death, left his wife only so much of his estate as he was
required to by statute.13 The wife contested the probate of the will on the
grounds that the testator was suffering from a mental delusion, viz., that she
6. N.Y. Dec. Estate Law § 130.
7. N.Y. Dec. Estate Law § 120.
8. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 20.
9. Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N.Y. 190 (1866).
10. Dobie v. Armstrong, 160 N.Y. 584, 55 N.E. 302 (1899).
1l. American Seamen's Friend Soc. v. Hopper, 33 N.Y. 619 (1865).
12. S N.Y.2d 244, 203 N.YS.2d 859 (1960).
13. N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 18.
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had been unfaithful to him, prior to the time of drawing the will. This she
contended deprived him of the necessary testamentary capacity and affected
the disposition of his estate under the will. The denial of probate of the will
by the Surrogate Court was based on a jury finding that testator at the time
of the drawing of the will was not of sound and disposing mind and memory.
The Appellate Division reversed upon the law and on the facts. 14 The Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division upon a finding that
the issue of testamentary capacity had been properly submitted to the jury
and to overturn their finding would be to deprive the jury of its traditional
function of passing on the facts. (Note: During the trial on the issue the wife
was allowed to testify concerning a personal communication between herself
(an interested party) and the deceased. Under Section 347 of the New York
Civil Practice Act this testimony should have been excluded and its admission
in evidence constitutes reversible error. The Court of Appeals, therefore,
reversed and ordered a new trial.) A dissent in the Court of Appeals was based
on a belief that the evidence as presented was not sufficient to establish a
question of fact as to testator's testamentary incapacity.
On the issue of testator's testamentary capacity, in the present case, there
was substantial competent evidence which indeed raised an inference that he
was under a delusion at the time of the drawing of the will. There is no doubt
that this delusion, viz., that his wife was unfaithful, had affected the disposition
of his estate under the will. The proponents sought to answer these contentions
in two ways, first, that there was a reasonable basis for the testator's belief and
secondly, even if the testator were acting under a delusion, there were other
valid reasons for the disposition he chose which would support the validity of
the will. The evidence presented by the proponent on his first point presented
a question of conflicting theories for the jury's determination, viz., was there a
reasonable basis for testator's belief or was there not. This conflict was resolved
by the jury in favor of the wife. Proponent's second argument was also re-
jected, for where it appears that a disposition under a will has been or might
have been affected by a delusion then the will must be invalidated.Y
SPEcIFIc LEGATEE NOT ENTITLED TO INSURANCE PROCEEDS OF ADEEMED GIFT
According to the law of ademption as it exists today, if an article specif-
ically devised is lost, stolen, destroyed, or substantially changed before the
will of the testator takes effect, the article is adeemed and cannot pass by the
will.16 The fact that any of the above mentioned events take place with or
without the consent or intent of the testator is immaterial. 7
In the case of In re Wright's Will,18 a diamond ring was specifically devised
14. 8 AD. 969, 190 N.Y.S.2d 845 (2d Dep't 1959).
15. Supra note 11.
16. Atkinson, Wills 742 (2d ed. 1953).
17. In re Brann, 219 N.Y. 263, 114 N.E. 404 (1916).
18. 7 N.Y.2d 365, 197 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1960).
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